Introduction
The process of integration towards a European Social Union consists of both past achievements and current deficits. It has developed on a delicate balance between on the one hand constitutive community principles of free movement and non-discrimination and on the other hand Member State jealously guarding their welfare competences. Despite national concerns, EU social integration has occurred. Primary and secondary social legislation has been adopted through the years, building up a Community social dimension with coordination of social security across borders, equal pay and treatment between gender, health and safety at the work place, employment law, regulation regarding insolvency, the posting of workers, the social dialogue, etcetera. In addition, the open methods of coordination address a wider range of social issues, however, without being binding on the Member States. On the other hand, European integration challenges social protection. The more recent economic governance of the European Union constrains national welfare policies. Convergence criteria, the stability and growth pact, and the European semester strain contemporary social and fiscal policies in the Member States. The crises and austerity measures work severely against social policies both at the European and national level as various contributions in this volume demonstrate.
The current movement towards a European Social Union thus consists of fragmented and contradictory dynamics, which on balance have negative implications for welfare policies. Such implications may be severe indeed. Ferrera compares nowadays socioeconomic challenges with the ones faced 100 years ago, where local social communities were dissolved and replaced by national standards. Ferrera argues that it's the same kind of economic fusion we see today, and it requires pan-European responses in order to prevent social conflicts.
As was the case one hundred years ago at the domestic level, the Europeanization ('fusion') of national markets through freedom of movement and competition rules is (already has been) a tremendous trigger for growth and job creation in the EU's economy, enhancing life chances and welfare for European citizens. But it is also a source of social and spatial disruptions. Again economic 'fusion' requires the introduction of some common social standards, rights and obligations through a socially friendly institutional re-articulation of the novel Europeanised space of interaction. as by which institutions the devices were decided (Section 2). Secondly, the chapter turns to the more substantive side of EU social regulation, the content and main achievements of the EU social dimension (Section 3) and takes us up to current challenges and increased politicization of EU social integration (Sections 4 and 5). Thirdly, in order to capture the legislative politics and conflict lines of social Europe in a post-Lisbon setting, the decision-making process on the regulation of posted workers is analysed (Section 6). Finally, the chapter concludes that the recent adoption of an enforcement directive for the posting of workers demonstrates that EU legislative politics can still deliver binding measures -even in the difficult political setting of EU28 (Section 7). positions and socioeconomic legacies, establishing a qualified majority certainly faces many obstacles. The EP may be co-legislator in the decision-making process. The EP has to establish a majority between its 751 members and different political groups. Its internal dynamics are conditioned by which committee and which rapporteur are in charge of a dossier. Finally when colegislating, the Council and the EP has to establish a compromise between them.
There are thus reasons to assume that the EU legislative process is hindered by institutional and political rivalry and that only few pieces of secondary legislation within EU social policy are adopted. When examining the development of social policy secondary legislation between 1971 and up to the time of writing May 2016, we find that 234 directives and regulations have been adopted. The examination over time, may surprise the reader for two reasons. First, the Commission has a considerable importance as decision-maker. The amount of regulations adopted by the non- 6 Regulations and directives are the two main binding legal acts in EU decision-making. A regulation shall be applied in its entirety across the EU and is directly binding, i.e. it does not have to be implemented by national law first. A directive sets outs the goals that the EU Member States must achieve, but the Member States have to adopt national legal instruments on how to reach these goals, i.e. the directive has to be implemented by national law first. majoritarian institution stands out. Second, although now a co-legislator in many areas, the role of the EP when it comes to the adoption of secondary legislation is still modest.
A European Social Union -Achievements and Challenges
However, Figure 1 viewed in the new Member States as 'irrational', 'short-sighted' and protectionist. 15 The situation came to a peak just before summer 2016 when the UK decided to leave the EU and thus cast the European Community into its most severe crisis ever. Free movement of persons and the right to cross border welfare were debated fiercely in the UK, and have been pointed out as a main reason for why the UK voted to leave. 16 The scope and limits of social Europe has become high politics.
The course of legal integration suggests a similar turn from an expansive reading of Union citizenship to a more restrictive approach. Dougan finds that between 1998-2008, the course of legal integration extended the application of Union citizenship on the basis of Treaty. 17 With the Regulating posting of workers has historically been and still is a politically conflictual part of social Europe. As cross-border welfare, regulating posting of workers intersects the internal market and social policy. The politics of regulating workers posted in another Member State dates back to the 1980s when the relation between public procurement regulation and the internal market was first debated. 32 The trade unions in the construction sector demanded a social clause in the public procurement regulations. The unions wanted the clause to be in line with the ILO Convention 94, meaning that posting firms would comply with the working conditions and collective agreements of hosting countries. But at that time, the Council was not ready to adopt a mandatory social clause.
The European Commission had, however, noted the concerns of the construction sector and in its 1991 social action programme, it stated that it would propose a separate directive on the posting of workers. 33 In the social action programme, the Commission also stated that it would propose a principle of chain liability to guard the social rights of posted workers in subcontracting.
In its proposal for the posting of workers directive, chain liability was, however, taken out. In its original proposal, the Commission proposed an article 3.2 according to which workers posted for less than three months, would be subject to the home Member State's labour laws. In December 1996, the posting of workers directive was adopted. 42 As a result of a political battle between internal market principles and social protection, it can be argued that the adopted directive foremost focused on the latter. The directive can thus be regarded as a major achievement for social Europe, but one which relies much on justifying and protecting national schemes in an internal market.
A decade later, this agreement on where to strike the balance between internal market and national social protection was severely challenged by the ECJ.
Legal Challenges and Political Responses
Known as the 'Laval quartet', the famous four cases Viking, Laval, Rüffert, and Commission v Luxembourg were ruled between the late 1997 and the summer of 1998. 43 In the cases, the European Court gave more consideration to the free movement principles against national labour regulation. In the Viking case, the Court ruled that the right to strike can only be exercised within certain limits.
In the Laval case, the Court followed suit and concluded that the Treaty's Article 49 (now Article On 21 March 2012, the Commission was, however, finally ready to present two documents:
(1) a proposal for the so called Monti II Regulation 47 , and (2) a proposal for an enforcement directive on the posting of workers 48 .
The Monti II proposal was a regulatory response to the Viking and Laval case law and aimed to clarify under which conditions the right to collective action could be exercised within the internal market. The proposal, however, proved to be short-lived. The Lisbon Treaty had empowered the national parliaments with an Early Warning Mechanism (EWM). 49 The mechanism gives parliaments the competence to issue reasoned opinions within eight weeks after a new proposal has been presented by the Commission. If one-third of the national parliaments raise an objection against a proposal and reason this objection in the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission have to reconsider the proposal and decide whether to withdraw it, change it or maintain it.
Although the national parliaments have many times issued reasoned opinions, the Monti II proposal was the first time they managed to pass the one-third threshold and do so within the eight week deadline. It was thus the first time that the national parliaments threw the 'yellow card'. 
Conclusion
The European Union has over time developed a social side to it in a delicate balance between internal market and social protection, between supranational and national competences. In setting the de facto scope and limits of social Europe, legislative politics play a key role. First because it has the capacity to adopt binding measures, which the Member States are obliged to implement and the European Union can enforce. Secondly, because they are the venue through which political agreements can be adopted by the EU majoritarian institutions. This is crucial when we consider the legitimacy of a European Social Union. Building up a European Social Union not only needs supranational devices 57 , it also needs a political mandate to ensure legitimacy.
The social implications of the internal market and the economic governance of the European Union stands out -also to the voters. EU social regulations is increasingly politicised. As demonstrated by the case of posting of workers regulation, also EU legislative politics has its clear conflict lines. However, when looking at the development of EU social legislation over time it 55 A reasoned opinion was submitted by: Bulgaria National Assembly, the Czech As other contributions to this volume have pointed out, the major decisions on the scope and limits of a European Social Union are not taken by means of the classic community method and its majoritarian institutions. This fact calls a set of fundamental challenges and asymmetries to the fore, which constitute considerable obstacles not only to a European Social Union -but also to the European Union itself:
(1) Decisions are sometimes taken by non-majoritarian institutions, by the few, by the experts. A European Social Union cannot emerge out of Brussels talking to Brussels. It cannot be imposed by a technocratic logic. The European Central Bank has appeared on the scene with a major say on national welfare policies. At the same time the European parliament and the national parliaments are not involved in main decisions taken, but as the posting of workers case demonstrates they will make noise where they can if not included. 
